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INTRODUCTION
THE UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIZATION
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
On behalf of the Duke University Global Capital Markets Cen-
ter, which is sponsoring this symposium, I am pleased to welcome
readers to the symposium issue.  The focus is on international securi-
tization, an increasingly important area of cross-border finance.  This
article introduces the reader to international securitization, first by
explaining the concepts of securitization and then by examining secu-
ritization in a cross-border context.
I.  CONCEPTS OF SECURITIZATION
In a securitization, a company partly “deconstructs” itself by
separating certain types of highly liquid assets from the risks generally
associated with the company.1  The company then can use these assets
to raise funds in the capital markets2 at a lower cost than if the com-
pany, with its associated risks, had raised the funds directly by issuing
debt or equity.  The company retains the savings generated by these
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1. This raises a threshold question of the propriety of separating a company from its most
liquid assets.  According to legend, a lawyer, upon learning of securitization, uttered that “it is a
perversion of natural law if the jewels of a company could be spirited away by lawyers’ trick-
ery.”  For a discussion of whether securitization ultimately provides benefits that outweigh any
perceived detriments, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION A-1 (3d ed. 2002) (analyzing whether securitization is a
zero-sum game).
2. The capital markets are “markets where capital funds—debt and equity—are traded.
Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well as organized markets and ex-
changes.”  JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS 59 (5th ed. 1998).
SCHWARCZ INTRO_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:14 PM
286 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:285
lower costs, while investors in the securitized assets benefit by holding
investments with lower risk.
In contrast, a company traditionally raises money by issuing securi-
ties that represent equity in the company or, in the case of debt securi-
ties, entitle the holders to claims for repayment.  Sometimes payment of
those claims is secured by a lien on certain of the company’s properties.
In each case the security holder looks primarily to the company for re-
payment.  If the company becomes financially troubled, or bankrupt,
payment of the securities may be jeopardized, or at least delayed.
Securitization, however, can change the security holder’s de-
pendence on the company for payment, by separating the source of
payment from the company itself.  In a typical structured financing, a
company that seeks to raise cash may transfer certain of its assets to a
special purpose vehicle or trust (hereinafter SPV) that is organized in
such a way that the likelihood of its bankruptcy is remote.3  The com-
pany involved is called the originator, because it usually originates the
assets.  The transfer is intended to separate the assets from risks asso-
ciated with the originator.  For this reason, the originator will often
structure the transfer so that it constitutes a “true sale,”4 a sale that is
sufficient under bankruptcy law to remove the assets from the origi-
nator’s bankruptcy estate.5
To achieve bankruptcy remoteness, the SPV’s organizational
structure also strictly limits its permitted business activities.  The goal
is to prevent creditors (other than holders of the SPV’s securities)
from having claims against the SPV that would enable them to file an
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the SPV.  Furthermore, an
SPV that is owned or controlled by the originator is usually required
to have one or more independent directors.  The SPV must also at-
tempt to observe all appropriate third party formalities with the
originator.  These additional steps help to reduce the risk that the
originator, if bankrupt, will either cause the SPV to voluntarily file for
3. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
133 (1994); 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 5.01 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d. ed.
1996 & Supp. 2002)
4. 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 3, § 5.03.  The term “true sale”
sometimes creates confusion because the characterization of a given transfer as a sale could re-
fer to the accounting, usury, tax, or bankruptcy treatment of the transfer, each of which is gov-
erned by different criteria.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).  Securitization is unlikely to create a fraudulent conveyance un-
der Section 548 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (or equivalent state fraudulent transfer law), be-
cause the purchase price paid to the originator is normally a reasonable exchange for the receiv-
ables sold.  11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
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bankruptcy or persuade a bankruptcy court, in the exercise of its eq-
uitable powers, to substantively consolidate the assets and liabilities
of the SPV with those of the originator.6
The result is that the assets are no longer owned by the origina-
tor, but by the SPV.  The assets themselves are typically payment ob-
ligations, such as accounts or other amounts receivable, owing to the
originator from third parties.  Those payment obligations generically
are referred to as “receivables” or, sometimes, “financial assets.”7
The entities obligated to pay the receivables are known as “obligors.”
The SPV, and not the originator, will issue securities—usually debt
or debt-like instruments—to raise cash.8  Those securities are intended
to be payable from collections on the receivables purchased by the SPV.
A potential buyer of the securities therefore looks to the cash flow from
the purchased receivables, and not necessarily to the credit of the origi-
nator, for repayment.  The risk that these payments may not be made
on time is an important factor in valuing the receivables.  As long as
the originator can reasonably predict the aggregate rate of default,
however, it can securitize even those receivables that present some
risk of uncollectibility.  Therefore, a statistically large pool of receiv-
ables due from many obligors, for which payment is reasonably pre-
dictable, is generally preferable to a pool of a smaller number of re-
ceivables due from a few obligors.
The separation of the selling company from the receivables them-
selves can enable the originator to raise funds at less expense, through
securities issued by the SPV, than if it raised funds through securities it
issued directly.  For example, the securities issued by the SPV, depend-
ing upon the structure of the transaction, may have a higher investment
rating than securities issued directly by the originator and, therefore,
would bear a lower interest rate than the originator might be able to ob-
tain on its own securities, bank lines of credit, or secured borrowings.  In
addition, the cash that is raised usually will not require an offsetting li-
ability to be shown on the originator’s balance sheet; from the stand-
point of the originator, the cash represents proceeds of the sale of re-
ceivables to the SPV.
6. For a discussion of substantive consolidation, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, § 3:4, at 3-
22–3-24 & nn.135–38.
7. Receivables can be short term (typically due in thirty days), such as trade receivables,
which represent the right to payment for goods sold or services rendered, or they can be long
term, such as payments due over a period of years under loans, leases, licenses, management
contracts, and other agreements.
8. These securities are sometimes referred to as “asset-backed securities.”
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If the originator is a bank or similar financial institution that is re-
quired to maintain risk-based capital under the capital-adequacy guide-
lines,9 securitization could also permit the originator to sell receivables
(e.g., loans reflected as assets on a bank’s financial statements) for
which it would otherwise be required to maintain capital.  That reduces
the bank’s effective cost of funds.
Further, an originator may be restricted by its indenture covenants
from incurring or securing debt beyond a specified level.  A structured
financing may enable the originator to raise cash in compliance with
such covenants, because the originator may be selling receivables and
not incurring or securing debt.  (Whether a structured financing would
violate particular covenants requires a case-by-case inquiry.)
II.  SECURITIZATION IN A CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT
Securitization has an increasingly international focus, in part be-
cause companies that wish to raise funds from the capital markets
may not be located in countries with established capital markets.10  In
order to access capital market funding, those companies will have to
structure deals that cross their national borders.
But cross-border securitization can be daunting to the uniniti-
ated.  It involves multiple legal systems with strange terms and some-
times even stranger rules.  Even if one could master the complexities
of a foreign legal system, one’s mastery would inevitably be short-
lived, for laws keep changing.  It is, however, unnecessary for a lawyer
who does not regularly practice in foreign jurisdictions to try to keep
up with changes in foreign legal systems.11  All that is needed is a
grasp of the fundamental legal principles of cross-border finance, in
order to ask the right questions of local counsel and understand the
response and its implications.12  It is, effectively, like learning a new
language, but one that has remarkable similarities to our own legal
language if one focuses on the fundamentals.13
9. See Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State Member Banks:
Leverage Measure, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. B (2002).
10. Established capital markets are located, for example, in New York, London, Hong
Kong, and other major financial centers.
11. This clearly does not suggest that foreign lawyers should not keep up with their own
jurisdictions’ laws.
12. It is important that local counsel understands the implications of the question in order
to think through any related legal principles.
13. In the following discussion, the perspective shifts back and forth among the originator,
the SPV, and investors in securities issued by the SPV, because all these perspectives must be
taken into account in structuring a securitization transaction.
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Recognizing that a growing segment of the world’s money is now
locked into receivables,14 and realizing the possibilities for economic
growth by unleashing that wealth, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has undertaken a project to
simplify cross-border receivables financing and reduce its cost.15  To
that end, UNCITRAL’s work has focused on drafting the Convention
on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (the Con-
vention).16  The Convention applies only to the assignment of receiv-
ables, and specifically avoids involvement in any other part of the fi-
nancing contract.17  However, its broad definition of “receivable”
would make it applicable to securitization.
A. Threshold Analysis: Jurisdictional Questions and the Source of
the Financing
The first step in any potential cross-border securitization is to de-
termine its jurisdictional framework, including the jurisdictions of the
company seeking financing—in our case, the originator—and of the
source of that financing.  A French company seeking to raise funds
from French capital markets is not engaged in a cross-border financ-
ing; it is a French financing and French law applies.  But if a French
company wants to use securitization to obtain funding from U.S. (or
London or Singapore) capital markets, it is a cross-border financing—
requiring examination of the laws of the jurisdictions whose borders
have been crossed and the manner in which those laws work (or,
more often, fail to work) together.18
14. Spiros V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing:
UNCITRAL’s Contribution, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 315 (1998); see also Summary of
UNCITRAL’s Work on Assignment in Receivables Financing (1997) (on file with the author)
(noting that “in developed countries the bulk of corporate wealth is locked up in receivables”).
15. UNCITRAL’s Working Group on International Contract Practices (Working Group)
first began work on receivables financing in 1995.  See Bazinas, supra note 14, at 316.
16. United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 2001, G.A. Res, 56/81, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/81 (2002), available at http://www.uncitral.org/stable/res5681-e.pdf (last visited Mar.
5, 2002); United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/payments/ctc-assignment-convention-e.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2002) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Convention].  For a discussion of the status
of the UNCITRAL Convention, see Spiros V. Bazinas, Multi-Jurisdictional Receivables Fi-
nancing: UNCITRAL’s Impact on Securitization and Cross-Border Perfection, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 365 (2002).
17. Bazinas, supra note 16, at 365–7.
18. The theme of knowing how to ask the right questions of local counsel presumes, of
course, that there is a manageable number of jurisdictions in which local counsel will be needed.
In some cases, many different jurisdictions have potential connections to the transaction.  Re-
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Where capital markets are the source of financing, one also must
consider the local regulatory restrictions on the use of those markets.
For example, U.S. capital markets are a significant source of securiti-
zation financing because they have a broad investor base and efficient
pricing.19  However, the issuance of securities to investors in these
markets may require disclosure and regulation, particularly if the se-
curities are issued without restrictions on trading (so-called “public”
offerings).20  In contrast, offshore or Euromarkets may be more flexi-
ble,21 but may have a more limited investor base.  Issuers of securities
solving those conflicts of laws, to try to reduce the number of local counsel, is the subject of a
considerable literature which is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g, JOHN G. COLLIER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1994); LAWRENCE COLLINS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1994); DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Law-
rence Collins et al. eds., 1993); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE
JUSTICE (1993); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2000).
19. Whether capital markets are efficient has been the subject of some debate.  This debate
revolves around the so-called “efficient market hypothesis.”  For a discussion of this debate, see
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 31–43 (3d ed. 2001).
20. The United States has a complex regulatory framework for issuing and dealing with
securities.  See SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at ch. 6.  This framework is based on the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
For other countries see, for example, Giovanni Nardulli & Antonio Segni, EU Cross-Border
Securities Offerings: An Overview, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 887 (1996); Barry A.K. Rider,
Global Trends in Securities Regulation: The Changing Legal Climate, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L. 513
(1995); Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Func-
tionalism: A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1994); Manning G. Warren III, The European Union’s Investment Serv-
ices Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 181 (1994); Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in In-
ternational Securities Regulations, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 347 (1995).
21. The prefix “Euro” indicates a type of transaction which is conducted offshore and in-
volves lenders or borrowers from countries other than that of the currency of denomination.
The markets are primarily the Eurobond, Eurocredit, and Eurodollar markets.  Eurobonds are
corporate bonds in U.S. dollars or other currencies, which are sold outside the country whose
currency is used.  See 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 783 (Peter
Newman et al. eds., 1992).  They “have become an important source of debt capital for both
large and small companies throughout the world.  Normally, a Eurobond issue is syndicated by a
consortium of international investment banks.  This provides wide exposure to investors in dif-
ferent countries.”  THE PORTABLE MBA DESK REFERENCE: AN ESSENTIAL BUSINESS
COMPANION 174 (Paul A. Argenti ed., 1994).  Eurocredit is a loan offered simultaneously from
several banks from more than one country.  See 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
MONEY & FINANCE, supra, at 783.  Eurodollars, a subset of Eurocurrency, means U.S. currency
held in a deposit outside the United States, primarily Europe.  Sometimes securities, debt as
well as equity, will be denominated in Eurodollars, which will have the effect of principal, inter-
est, and dividends being paid out of U.S. dollars deposited outside the United States. Whether
this is attractive or not is influenced by exchange rates, but U.S. companies tend to
raise capital in European [or other overseas] markets when U.S. market rates are un-
favorable.  This action can be an especially attractive avenue for companies making an
initial public offering that splits into two tranches—one to be traded on U.S. ex-
changes, and the other, a Eurotranche, to be traded on a European exchange.
THE PORTABLE MBA DESK REFERENCE: AN ESSENTIAL BUSINESS COMPANION, supra, at 175.
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sometimes can avoid regulation entirely by combining markets—for
example, using U.S. capital markets for a private placement of subor-
dinated debt to support a public offering of senior debt securities
conducted offshore.
B. Structuring the Transaction
As discussed in Part I, investors generally prefer that the transfer
of receivables from the originator to the SPV be structured as a sale.22
This is especially true where local law would protect the originator’s
assets against creditor enforcement, as with the automatic stay under
U.S. bankruptcy law.23  In a cross-border context, however, the parties
can reduce costs by structuring the transfer of receivables as a secured
loan, rather than a sale,24 if the SPV (as creditor) would be able to en-
force its rights against the pledged receivables in the event of the local
law equivalent of a bankruptcy case against the originator.25
A related question is how the originator must account for the
transaction on its balance sheet.  If the transaction is a loan, the origi-
nator would account for it as debt.  But if the transaction is accom-
plished through a sale, the originator may be able to avoid booking a
debt (“off-balance sheet financing”).26  The ultimate accounting
treatment would be subject to the accounting principles that prevail in
the originator’s jurisdiction,27 although there is some movement to-
wards international harmonization of accounting standards.28
22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of structuring a se-
curitization transaction as a true sale under U.S. law).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).  A secured creditor could not foreclose on its collateral
without court permission, which is rarely given.  European countries increasingly have been
adopting bankruptcy laws that include a stay of action by creditors against a bankrupt company
in order to facilitate the company’s rehabilitation.  See generally Eberhard Schollmeyer, The
New European Convention on International Insolvency, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1997).
24. The parties can thereby save the significant transaction costs of implementing a “two-
tier” sale structure, which is often necessary in a sale context to enable the originator to recoup
the residual value of the transferred receivables once the SPV’s investors are paid in full.  See
Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 141–42.
25. For an article analyzing whether particular securitization transactions should be viewed
as loans or sales, see Peter Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Finan-
cial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996).
26. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 142.
27. Accounting principles vary widely among countries.  In the United States, Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are used for reporting purposes.  For other purposes,
as in tax or corporate law, deviations from GAAP are used.  How substantial the differences
between jurisdictions can be is best illustrated by an example.  When Daimler-Benz, the Ger-
man automaker, wanted to have a listing on the New York Stock Exchange, it did not want to
file financial information according to U.S. GAAP.  When it eventually did file, it showed a loss
of DM 949 million instead of a profit of DM 168 million it had shown under German accounting
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C. Commercial Finance Issues
I next examine how the SPV and its investors stand as against the
originator’s creditors, and whether any part of the securitization
transaction is potentially preferential, fraudulent (whether intention-
ally or, under local law, constructively), or in some other way prob-
lematic.  These questions typically are addressed by laws that seek to
allocate priority to collateral or to ensure equality of distribution, or
preserve the integrity, of a debtor’s estate.
1. Perfection and Priority.  The term “perfection” often is used
to refer to protection of a transferee’s interest in transferred assets
from creditors of the transferor.29  For assets that are physically lo-
cated in a particular jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction, or some-
times of the transferor’s jurisdiction, usually governs perfection.  In a
securitization transaction, perfection means protecting the SPV’s in-
terest in the transferred receivables from claims of the originator’s
creditors.  Because receivables are intangible and therefore not physi-
cally located in any particular jurisdiction, the law of the originator’s
jurisdiction intuitively would be expected to, and usually does, govern
perfection.30
Some jurisdictions have a filing or other public notice system for
perfection.31  Other legal systems may require notification of obligors,
which may be unacceptable and expensive.32  Often, the local perfec-
rules.  See David Waller, Daimler-Benz Pierces Accounting Mystique, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1993, at 24; see also Richard Waters, Survey of Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets (2): The
World According to U.S. GAAP, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at 34.
28. See Peter C. Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting Standards, and the
Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 341 (2002).
29. Or from the transferor’s bankruptcy representative.  In some jurisdictions, the concept
of perfection is not well recognized.  Once an asset is transferred, the transferor is simply
deemed no longer to have an interest in the asset.
30. Under the UNCITRAL Convention, the location of assignor would govern.  See Bazi-
nas, supra note 16, at 381; accord U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (2000).  This is not, however, a universal
rule.  Some jurisdictions may look, for example, to the “law of the receivable,” meaning the law
of the contract under which the receivable arose or the law of the jurisdiction where the obligor
is located.  Except to the extent large concentrations of obligors are located in a given jurisdic-
tion, it may be impractical to consult local counsel in each obligor’s jurisdiction.
31. The purpose of filing is “to place third parties on notice of the transfer” of the asset.  In
the United States, this is usually done by filing a U.C.C.-1 financing statement.  UNCITRAL
has proposed a registration system for this purpose.  See SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at B-1 (In-
ternational Perfection).
32. Besides the obvious costs involved in having to notify all the obligors of, for example,
trade receivables, it sometimes may also be culturally unacceptable to do so because notification
might be seen as a signal that the company is in financial difficulties.  “This is a problem practi-
tioners often run into . . . But it is a problem that is not documented in the literature.”  Petrina
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tion procedures may be unclear or impractical, in which case investors
are forced to rely on the originator’s representations, warranties, and
covenants that the receivables transferred to the SPV are, and will
remain, unencumbered by third parties.33
Priority generally refers to the ranking of multiple claims against
a transferred asset.  In a securitization context, it means that the
SPV’s and investors’ claims against the transferred receivables are
superior to any third-party claims.34  Priority is normally accom-
plished, in a jurisdiction that perfects by filing, by being the first to
file against the receivables.35  If the originator is located in a jurisdic-
tion that does not have a filing or other registration system to indicate
priority, the investors again may have to rely on the originator’s rep-
resentations, warranties, and covenants.  This, of course, creates a
much greater risk of fraud than where a public filing system is used.
If the transaction involves receivables that will be created at a fu-
ture date,36 one also must ask if the local law permits the transfer of
an asset not then in existence.37  Bankruptcy or insolvency laws38 also
may restrict an originator’s ability to transfer its future receivables.39
R. Dawson, Rating Games with Contingent Transfer: A Structured Finance Illusion, 8 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 381, 399 n.102 (1998).
33. However, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at B-7–B-11 (analyzing the potential benefits
of implementing a uniform perfection system for securitization and other forms of cross-border
receivables financing).
34. Priority refers generally to the “relative ranking of claims to the same property . . . . In
bankruptcy, [it] refers to secured claims that by statute receive more favorable treatment than
other, unsecured, claims.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1212 (7th ed. 1999).
35.  Sometimes referred to as “first-in-time, first-in-right,” this generally gives priority to
the first person to file against the asset.  Priority is ascertained by searching the filing records to
determine whether other parties have prior filings against the relevant assets.  See, e.g., U.C.C. §
9-322 (2000).
36. For example, certain cross-border financings are supported by payments to be made in
the future under international telephone contracts.  An example for such a transaction is the
private placement by Teléfonos de México, S.A. (TelMex), the Mexican telephone company.
For further information on this transaction, see generally Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securi-
tization: The Case of the Disappearing Political Risk, 38 VA. INT’L L.J. 293 (1998).
37. The UNCITRAL Convention allows for this.  See Bazinas, supra note 16, at 372; see
also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible
Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market
Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 149 n.36 (examining U.S. law on selling future
payments under a contract not yet in existence).  Many civil laws provide that a pledge or as-
signment can only be made when an asset exists.  This is based on the civil law view that a
pledge is a real right “as opposed to a personal right; it gives the creditor a right to seize and sell
assets and get a privilege on the proceeds of the sale.”  Michael H. Rubin & McGinchey Staf-
ford Lang, Recent Developments In Security Devices, With an Emphasis on Louisiana Law, ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY 571, 588, Westlaw, ALI-ABA file.
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Without a system for making transfers of receivables publicly as-
certainable, securitization is discouraged because the SPV will not be
able to determine its priority at the time of the transfer.
UNCITRAL’s Convention proposes an optional centralized registra-
tion system that could be used to provide such notice.  It would pro-
vide, for states opting in, that “[a]s between assignees of the same re-
ceivable from the same assignor, the priority of the right of an
assignee in the assigned receivable is determined by the order in
which data about the assignment are registered [under a centralized
registration system established by the Convention], regardless of the
time of transfer of the receivable.”40
2. Commingling.  Another risk is that cash proceeds of receiv-
ables pledged or sold to an SPV may be mixed, or “commingled,”
with the originator’s own funds.  This risk to some extent reflects
common sense: if the originator is freely permitted to use collections,
a court may find the originator’s control inconsistent with the SPV’s
claim that it has a perfected interest in the collections.  Local law may
ameliorate this risk somewhat.41  Commingling also can be prevented
by using lockboxes, or by segregating cash flows.  Control over cash
flows—such as requiring obligors to make payments into a trust ac-
count located in the U.S.—also may mitigate the perfection risk.42  If
these approaches are not available, one should ascertain whether pro-
38. Such as 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Rights, Preventing
Windfalls: A Model for Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L. REV.
403, 434 (1997) (analyzing U.S. bankruptcy law restrictions on floating liens, and arguing those
restrictions should not apply to securitization transactions).
39. In a collateral context, a lien on future arising assets is often referred to as a floating
lien.  See U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 2 (2000).
40. Annex to the UNCITRAL Convention, supra note 16, § I, art. 1; see also UNCITRAL
Convention, supra note 16, art. 42 (implementing optional registration).  This rule contrasts, for
example, with a rule that would determine priority by the time of transfer of the receivables,
which is not always ascertainable.  For an expanded discussion of these issues, see SCHWARCZ,
supra note 1, at B-3–B-4.
41. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-315 (2000) (allowing tracing of proceeds).
42. In civil law countries, however, bailment, custody, and other trust concepts may not
always be recognized with respect to commingled cash, as civil law countries generally do not
recognize trust concepts.  See generally Justin P. Thorens, The Common Law Trust and the Civil
Law Lawyer, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY 309–15 (David S. Clark ed., 1990); Dono-
van W.M. Waters, The Institution of the Trust in Civil and Common Law, 252 RECUEIL DES
COURS 113 (1995).  But see Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
967, 968–69, 976–79 (1999) (arguing that the trust is a civil law concept).
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ceeds are traceable, and ask local counsel whether traced proceeds
are protected.43
Under the Convention, commingling risk is minimized.44
3. Preferential and Fraudulent Transfers.  The bankruptcy, in-
solvency, or related laws of some jurisdictions may permit or require
a bankrupt company (or its representative)45 to avoid transfers of as-
sets, or obligations incurred, by the company prior to its bankruptcy.
Some of these laws—referred to as preference laws because they
avoid preferential transfers—are intended to ensure equality of dis-
tribution of the company’s assets among all its creditors.46  Less fre-
quently, transfers made or obligations incurred by a troubled com-
pany for less than equivalent value may be deemed to be fraudulent
and therefore voidable.47
In a securitization context, preference and fraudulent transfer
laws are unlikely to apply because any transfers of receivables from
the originator to an SPV tend to be structured as sales for arm’s
length consideration.
43. Another potential concern is that the method of perfection may refer to the original
collateral, but not to the proceeds.  If the anticipated form of the proceeds is known (e.g., cash),
that concern can be alleviated by also describing the proceeds.
44. Article 14.1(b) of the Convention provides that “[i]f payment in respect of the assigned
receivable is made to the assignor, the assignee is entitled to payment of the proceeds.”
UNCITRAL Convention, supra note 16, art. 14.1(b).  Article 24.2 of the Convention provides
that “[i]f proceeds are received by the assignor, the right of the assignee in those proceeds has
priority over the right of a competing claimant in those proceeds . . . if (a) The assignor has re-
ceived the proceeds under instructions from the assignee to hold the proceeds for the benefit of
the assignee; and (b) The proceeds are held by the assignor for the benefit of the assignee sepa-
rately and are reasonably identifiable from the assets of the assignor, such as in the case of a
separate deposit or securities account containing only proceeds consisting of cash securities.”
Id. art. 24.2(a), (b).  Article 13.1 also would lessen the likelihood that commingling would occur,
by authorizing the assignor or assignee to notify the obligor on the receivables to pay the as-
signee directly: “[T]he assignor or the assignee or both may send the debtor [i.e., the obligor on
the receivables] notification of the assignment and a payment instruction, but after notification
has been sent only the assignee may send such an instruction.”  Id. art. 13.1.  Article 17.2 clari-
fies that “[a]fter the debtor [i.e., the obligor on the receivables] receives notification of the as-
signment, . . . the debtor is discharged only by paying the assignee . . . or in accordance with such
payment instruction.”  Id. art. 17.2.
45. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, that representative is called the trustee in bankruptcy.  11
U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
46. In the United States, for example, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000) limits preferential transfers
made within ninety days (or, if the transferee is an “insider,” made within one year) of the com-
pany’s bankruptcy.
47. Whether or not the transfer in fact is fraudulent.  The concept of “constructive fraud,”
for example, is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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The Convention does not cover these issues directly, but it does
generally specify the choice of preference law that would apply.48
This may allow the parties to a receivables financing to better under-
stand their rights by consulting insolvency counsel who are expert in
that law.
D. Contractual and Legal Restrictions
The next issue is whether contractual or legal restrictions affect
the financing. There are two ways that contractual restrictions can
arise.  First, there may be restrictions (anti-assignment clauses) in the
contract pursuant to which collateral or receivables are originated.
For example, a lease or license contract may prohibit the lessor’s (or
licensor’s) assignment of rights to payment received thereunder.  Un-
der U.S. law, certain restrictions on the assignment of receivables,
such as accounts receivable, are unenforceable, but the laws of other
jurisdictions will differ.49
The Convention permits certain assignments notwithstanding
anti-assignment clauses.50  However, the Convention still protects ob-
ligors who would be harmed by the assignment by making the as-
signor liable for breach of the prohibition.51  The Convention also pro-
tects obligors by clarifying that the assignment of receivables does not
increase their burden.52
Contractual restrictions also can arise through negative pledge or
similar covenants contained in the originator’s financing documents.53
48. UNCITRAL Convention, supra note 16, arts. 22, 23.3, 30.3.
49. See U.C.C. § 9-406 (2000); Bazinas, supra note 16, at 372.  The implicit rationale for
nullifying restrictions on the assignment of receivables might be that the obligor on the receiv-
able is not prejudiced by its assignment, whereas enforcing an anti-assignment clause would im-
pair the free alienability of property rights.  A receivable represents the originator’s right to
payment; and property, after all, is merely a bundle of rights.
50. Article 9.1 of the Convention provides that “[an] assignment of a receivable is effective
notwithstanding any agreement between the . . . assignor and the debtor [i.e., the obligor on
receivables] . . . limiting in any way the assignor’s right to assign its receivables.”  UNCITRAL
Convention, supra note 16, art. 9.1.  Article 9, however, only applies to the types of receivables
listed in subsection (3) thereof.  Id. art. 9.3.
51. Article 9.2 of the Convention provides that “[n]othing in this article affects any obliga-
tion or liability of the assignor for breach of such an agreement.”  Id. art. 9.2.  The assignee,
however, is not necessarily liable to the debtor for such a breach: “A person who is not party to
such an agreement is not liable on the sole ground that it had knowledge of the agreement.”  Id.
52. Thus, Article 15.1 of the Convention provides that “assignment does not, without the
consent of the debtor [i.e., the obligor on the receivables], affect the rights and obligations of the
debtor, including the payment terms contained in the original contract.”  Id. art. 15.1.
53. These financing documents typically were put into place for other financings, not the
financing being structured.  For example, negative pledge clauses prohibit or limit the creation
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Sometimes financings must be restructured to get around a restrictive
covenant.54  This takes creativity and an understanding of how the
covenant is to be interpreted.  For example, would a covenant re-
stricting a secured loan also restrict a sale?  The answer can be am-
biguous if, under the governing law, the line between a sale and a se-
cured loan is unclear.  Furthermore, the governing law is not always
obvious.  For example, the covenant may be contained in a financing
document stated to be governed by English law, but the covenant
may prohibit liens on assets of a company located in Mexico.  To de-
termine whether English law or Mexican law governs the interpreta-
tion of whether the financing in question violates the covenant by
creating a lien, counsel in both jurisdictions must be consulted.
Sometimes even then the answer may be unclear.
Finally, one must consider whether local law itself restricts the
financing.
E. Enforcement Issues
In an international context, it is not enough to have theoretical
rights under the law.  The critical question is whether one can enforce
those rights,55 recognizing that the legal system granting the rights
may not be the same as the one in which enforcement occurs, and that
foreigners may not be viewed favorably when enforcing rights against
local citizens.  Investors will want the originator to submit to their ju-
risdiction, or at least the jurisdiction of the SPV.56  Of course, inves-
tors must determine whether those jurisdictions would enforce such
an arrangement.  Submission to jurisdiction could entail, for example,
of secured debt.  On the issue of negative pledge clauses, see generally Thomas C. Mitchell, The
Negative Pledge Clause and the Classification of Financing Devices: A Question of Perspective,
First Installment, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (1986); Thomas C. Mitchell, The Negative Pledge
Clause and the Classification of Financing Devices: A Question of Perspective, Second Install-
ment, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 263 (1986).
54. Sometimes the covenants are so restrictive that the securitization simply cannot be ac-
complished.
55. A scene from a Broadway play about a “realpolitik” elementary school class illustrates
this general point.  In the math lesson, the teacher asked how Joe, Jim and Bob would split six
bananas if Joe had two, Jim had four, and Bob joined them for lunch.  The answer was that Bob
was strongest and took all the bananas.
56. To be able to adjudicate a case, a court must have both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 852.  Subject matter jurisdiction
means a court can hear a particular kind of case.  See id. at 852, 1438.  Personal jurisdiction
means the court has legal power over the parties to enforce a judgment.  See id. at 857.  While
several legal grounds exist for personal jurisdiction, from the perspective of a potential plaintiff
the “safest” way to ensure such jurisdiction is to obtain consent of the party before a cause of
action has arisen.
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appointing an agent of the originator in the investors’ (or SPV’s) ju-
risdiction to accept service of legal process, usually referred to as a
“process agent.”
If investors can obtain jurisdiction over the originator in their
own (or the SPV’s) jurisdiction, it may not matter that the originator
has no significant assets outside of its home jurisdiction.  Investors
would simply sue where the originator has submitted to jurisdiction,
obtain a judgment, and take the judgment to the originator’s home ju-
risdiction to be enforced.57  However, counsel in the home jurisdiction
should be consulted in advance to verify whether such a judgment
would be recognized and what, if any, defenses could be raised to its
enforcement.
Another potential problem is that the originator itself could be
immune from suit under its local law, particularly if it has sovereign
or quasi-sovereign ownership.58  Requiring the originator to waive
sovereign immunity may be a solution to this problem.  In the U.S.,
for example, such a waiver is enforceable under the U.S. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as amended.59  This, however, only
means that U.S. courts will respect the waiver of sovereign immunity.
One still must ask local counsel whether the waiver will be respected
in the originator’s jurisdiction.
Other sovereign risks include currency exchange controls—the
risk that the originator’s home jurisdiction may limit the export or
private use of U.S. dollars or other relevant foreign currency.60  This
57. While arbitral awards are governed by the U.N. Convention for the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, no such treaty exists for the enforcement of foreign
judgments.  Countries often recognize foreign judgments on the basis of reciprocity.  In the
United States, this varies from state to state; however, several states have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money Recognition Act and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act.  See
generally Shirley Sostre-Oquendo, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
United States and Canada in the Free Trade Era, 1992 DET. C. L. REV. 1019; see also Christopher
P. Hall & David B. Gordon, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States 57 (1997),
WESTLAW, INLPRAC file.  In other countries, similar laws exist.  See, e.g., INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 1152 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983).
58. Sovereign immunity is traditionally a concept of public international law.  Under this
concept the sovereign, historically the monarch, today the state and its officials, cannot be sued
unless they consent.  While it was considered to be absolute in the beginning, over time certain
recognized exemptions have developed.  See MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 491–
522 (4th ed. 1997).  The most important exemption under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act is the “commercial activity exemption.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994).  A similar example
can be found in the United Kingdom in § 3(3) of its State Immunity Act of 1978.  See SHAW,
supra, at 505.
59. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
60. Currency control has occurred before in at least several places, for example in Brazil,
Nigeria, China, Romania, South Africa, Venezuela and, at least de facto, in Mexico.  See, e.g.,
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risk might be mitigated by issuing securities denominated in local cur-
rency (rather than U.S. dollars).61  Risk mitigation can also be at-
tained if the originator has significant assets outside its home jurisdic-
tion or offshore obligors on receivables,62 or by arranging local
currency swaps for U.S. dollars (discussed below).  One should also
inquire whether the originator’s home jurisdiction has ever imposed,
or is likely to impose, debt moratoria of the type that would restrict
the originator from paying its debts to foreigners.63  Finally, inquiry
should be made as to whether the SPV must be licensed in that juris-
diction to enforce its rights against the originator.
F. Currency Exchange, Swaps, and Hedging
Currency exchange issues loom large in cross-border finance.
The problem is that the currency in which investors invest may be dif-
ferent than the currency received to repay them.  For example, if in-
vestors buy U.S. dollar-denominated securities to enable an SPV to
purchase a portfolio of Japanese yen-denominated receivables, the
investors would be taking the added risk that, when the receivables
pay, the dollar-to-yen exchange rate would yield insufficient dollars to
Scott McMurray, Soybean Futures Prices are Expected to Plunge on Reforms Unveiled by the
President of Brazil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1990, at C12; Thomas Petzinger Jr. & Peter Truell,
U.K. Audit Points to Larger BCCI Role by Two Top U.S. Cable-TV Executives, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 1992, at A4; Trade Conference in Beijing Attracts U.S. Businessmen, WALL ST. J., June
21, 1988, at A65; Romania Revives Currency Curb, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1992, at A8; Ken Wells,
U.S. Investment in South Africa Quickens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1994, at A15; Observer: Caracas
Chestnut, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 1994, at 15; David Asman, The Americas: Complex Models Won’t
Stop Mexico’s Peso From Tumbling, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1995, at A11.  For a description of the
international obligations that impact a country’s ability to impose exchange controls, see gener-
ally Central and East European Law Initiative, Currency Exchange Controls: A Concept Paper
Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria, 29 INT’L LAW. 257 (1995).
61. However, exchange controls could limit the export of the local currency.  Furthermore,
investors may not want to invest in securities denominated in a local currency.
62. That way, enforcement against those assets or obligors will not, de facto, be subject to
the local laws of the company’s country.
63. Debt moratoria have happened before, for example in the Philippines, South Africa,
and Russia.  See Julia Leung, Filipinos Plan Again to Issue Overseas Bonds, WALL ST. J., Oct.
30, 1992, at B4; Neil Behrmann, South Africa Hopes to Reschedule Debt as Total Declines,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 1993; Terence Roth & Tim Carrington, Moscow Stops Paying Bank Debt
Principal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1991, at A3.  Most recently, Indonesia was considering such a
moratorium, but eventually opted against it.  See Darren McDermott, Jakarta’s Debt Plan
Opens to Mixed Reviews, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1998, at A1.  Certain countries may have political
risks.  Political risk insurance sometimes may be available to cover specific risks, although it is
very expensive.  See Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 283 (1998).
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repay them.64  Investors generally prefer the exchange rate risk to be
“hedged”65 through “swaps” and other derivative products.
A “derivative” product means a contract that creates future
rights and obligations regarding an asset that underlies a larger trans-
action.66  Derivative products can be broken down into forward con-
tracts and options.  In an option, one party pays for the right (but not
the obligation) to buy an asset at a future date for a negotiated price.67
A forward contract is a contractual obligation to buy (or, from the
seller’s standpoint, to sell) an asset, such as foreign currency, at a
specified price at a future settlement date.  A swap is an array of for-
ward contracts—a forward contract covering each date that settle-
ment is to be made.68
Currency hedging is accomplished by entering into a swap with a
third party (called a swap counterparty) to exchange the relevant cur-
rencies at the future settlement dates.69  The parties contractually
agree in advance to the exchange rate that will be deemed to apply on
64. Of course, investors could convert the yen to dollars on the spot market.  “A spot
transaction involves the immediate purchase of, payment for, and delivery of a fixed amount of
a currency.  Such transactions are said to occur on the spot market.”  John Huguet, Global Fi-
nancial Thinking, in AMA MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 6-40, 6-43 (John J. Hampton ed., 3d ed.
1994).  But fluctuating exchange rates put investors at risk that a weakened yen would yield in-
sufficient dollars.
65. “Hedging, using the futures market, is the process of neutralizing or significantly re-
ducing financial risks . . . . There are two fundamental reasons for hedging.  The first is to reduce
risk . . . . The second is the ability to separate the timing decision from market opportunities.”
See Robert W. Hiller, Sources of Financing: Traditional and New, in AMA MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 6-25, 6-32 (John J. Hampton ed., 3d ed. 1994).
66. See, e.g., Joseph L. Motes III, Note, A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of Derivative
Instruments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579, 583–84 (1996).  A great deal of derivative documentation is
standardized worldwide through use of so-called “ISDA forms” developed by the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association.  See generally http://www.isda.org (last visited Apr. 28,
2002).
67. See Motes, supra note 66, at 589; Hiller, supra note 65, at 6–32.
68. See Motes, supra note 66, at 590.  The actual underlying swapped assets are rarely ex-
changed.  Rather, one party to the swap makes a payment to the other based on the net valua-
tion of the swapped assets on the future settlement date.  See JOHN F. MARSHALL & KENNETH
R. KAPNER, THE SWAPS MARKET 32 (2d ed. 1993) (“The underlying assets may or may not be
exchanged and are referred to as notionals.”).  The asset could be foreign currencies in the case
of currency swaps in cross-border finance transactions, or might be oil in the case of a swap in-
volving a company that needs oil at a future date and wants to fix the price.  Swaps are therefore
akin to gambles on future asset values.  Indeed, there is ongoing controversy as to whether de-
rivative products can be abused, particularly where investors borrow on leverage to purchase
derivative products for speculation.  In a non-leveraged context, however, the use of derivatives
to hedge currency (or interest rate) risks in cross-border transactions is not only prudent but
essential for minimizing the risk to investors.
69. Counterparties are often financial institutions, or their affiliates, that deal in derivative
products (swap dealers).
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those settlement dates to ensure that the currency conversion will
yield sufficient dollars to repay investors.  Thus, if the investors expect
to receive payment in Japanese yen and, based on the anticipated
amount of yen, need an exchange rate of 126.29 yen per U.S. dollar to
be fully repaid in dollars, a swap counterparty would be sought who is
willing to exchange dollars for yen at that rate on the future settle-
ment dates.  If on a settlement date the exchange rate has changed to
130 yen per dollar, the investors would be protected because the swap
counterparty has taken the currency exchange risk.  But the swap
party would profit on the exchange if the exchange rate has become
125 yen per dollar.
Investors, of course, will want to be comfortable that the coun-
terparty will be able to perform its swap obligations on each settle-
ment date if the net value of the swap at that date runs against the
counterparty.70  If, therefore, there is a realistic risk that the counter-
party may be unable to perform, the investors may attempt to mini-
mize performance risk by requiring the counterparty to collateralize
its future obligations or obtain a third-party guaranty, not unlike a
lender requiring assurance of future performance from a borrower.
The performance risk also can be minimized by requiring the coun-
terparty to make daily or other periodic adjustment payments of the
changing net value of the swap, thereby reducing the risk that the
counterparty will be unable to pay the net amount due at a future
date.  This is referred to as “marking to market.”71
The terms of the swap agreement also may be relevant.  For ex-
ample, any conditions precedent to effectiveness may need to be sat-
isfied at the closing when the investors provide financing.  Also, the
SPV may be subject to taxes if it gains the advantage of the swap.72
G. Tax Issues
In general, there are three central tax issues that arise in securiti-
zation transactions.  The first is whether the transfer of receivables
70. That is, if the exchange rate has changed to make the value of the currency that the
counterparty has agreed to sell higher than the price it agreed to accept for the sale.
71. For a description of the mark-to-market methodology, see Jon Moynihan, Measuring
the Risk Adjusted Profitability of Derivative Products on Bank Capital, in THE HANDBOOK OF
CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 25-1, 25-9–25-11 (Robert J. Schwartz &
Clifford W. Smith Jr. eds., 1990).  Forward contracts that include periodic marking to market
are called “futures contracts.”  For the relation between mark-to-market and futures, see
MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 68, at 19.
72. Investors may try to require payments to be made net of taxes.  See infra Section II.G.
(discussing indemnity and gross-up provisions).
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from the originator to the SPV will be treated for tax purposes as a
sale, requiring recognition of gain or loss, or as a loan.  The second is
the degree to which the SPV itself will be subject to tax (the so-called
“entity-level” tax).  The third is the tax treatment of investors who
purchase these securities.
From a U.S. standpoint, tax issues in cross-border securitization
transactions include those relevant in purely domestic securitization
transactions73 as well as additional issues that may have to be deter-
mined under foreign as well as (or instead of) U.S. law, depending on
the location of the originator, the receivables, and the SPV.  These
additional tax issues are discussed below.
1. Withholding Tax.  Payments in a securitization transaction of
amounts treated as interest for income tax purposes may be subject to
U.S. or foreign withholding taxes, and the cost thereof must be fac-
tored into the particular transaction.  This can occur, for example, if
there is a tax sale of receivables with obligors in one country paying
interest on the underlying receivables to an SPV or investors in an-
other country; if a transaction between the originator in one country
and an SPV or ultimate investor in another country is treated as a tax
loan; or if an SPV in one country raises money by issuing debt to in-
vestors in another country.
Many countries, including the United States (at a statutory rate
of thirty percent), impose a withholding tax on the gross amount of
interest paid to certain foreign persons not otherwise engaged in
business in the country from which the interest is paid.74  The amount
is withheld by the payor on behalf of the payee and paid over to the
appropriate taxing authority.75  Frequently, this withholding tax is re-
73. For a detailed discussion of these domestic issues, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at ch.
5.
74. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442 (1994).  There is a statutory exemption from U.S. withholding
tax for “portfolio interest.”  26 U.S.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999).  “Portfolio inter-
est” does not, however, include interest received by a bank on an extension of credit made pur-
suant to a loan agreement entered into in the ordinary course of its trade or business (26 U.S.C.
§ 881(c)(3)(A) (1994)), interest received by parties owning ten percent or more of the interests
in a debtor corporation or partnership (26 U.S.C. §§ 871(h)(3)(B), 881(c)(3)(B) (1994)), or cer-
tain “contingent” interest, determined by reference to cash flow, income, change in value of
property or distributions made by a debtor or related person (26 U.S.C. § 871(h)(4) (1994 &
Supp. 1999)).  The portfolio interest exemption will be available in certain securitization trans-
actions.
75. The IRS has issued new regulations which, to some degree, simplify the responsibilities
of withholding agents and the means of identifying entitlement to exemptions from withholding
tax.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e) (1997) (discussing withholding agent’s reliance on bene-
ficial owner withholding certificates, intermediary withholding certificates, qualified intermedi-
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duced or eliminated pursuant to the applicable terms of an income
tax treaty between the country of the payee and that of the payor, but
this will not always be the case.  If not eliminated, it will be necessary
to determine which party will bear the cost of the tax.  In most cases,
this cost will be borne by the payor, by means of an indemnity and
“gross-up” provision under which the payor is required to pay the
payee an extra amount so as to compensate, on an after-tax basis, for
the tax withheld.  Establishing an SPV in a tax haven jurisdiction or in
a jurisdiction with a wide tax treaty network sometimes may minimize
withholding tax costs.
Bilateral tax treaties (between the originator’s and the SPV’s ju-
risdictions), where they exist, can reduce or eliminate withholding
taxes.  For example, such tax treaties exist between the United States
and most major European countries, and also among European Un-
ion countries.
2. Taxation of the SPV and Its Shareholders.  As noted above, it
sometimes may be desirable to form an SPV involved in a cross-
border securitization in a tax haven jurisdiction.  This will both mini-
mize withholding tax on any interest payments made by the SPV and
avoid mainstream tax on net income of the SPV, assuming it is an en-
tity subject to such tax.  Use of a tax haven can, however, also in-
crease the potential withholding tax burden on any interest payments
to be made to the SPV, either by the underlying obligors on the re-
ceivables or by the originator, because tax havens are not typically
parties to tax treaties that would eliminate withholding taxes.
It is also important to ensure that the SPV will not be subject to
any mainstream income tax in a jurisdiction other than that in which
it is actually resident.  For example, if the SPV owns receivables of
obligors in another jurisdiction and the originator services the receiv-
ables in that other jurisdiction on behalf of the SPV, the question
arises whether the SPV will be deemed to be “doing business” or to
have a “permanent establishment” in that jurisdiction.  Either finding
could subject the SPV to mainstream income tax in that jurisdiction.
Generally, however, the SPV will not be subjected to such tax if the
servicer is performing purely ministerial functions and has no power
to bind the SPV in any way (e.g., by virtue of being able to agree to
changes in the terms of the receivables).
ary withholding certificates and certain presumptions available to withholding agents for pur-
poses of treating a payee as foreign or domestic).
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With respect to the United States, a corporation will not be
deemed engaged in a trade or business therein if it only effects trans-
actions in stocks or securities for its own account; this is because there
is a statutory safe harbor against being treated as so engaged if activi-
ties are limited to investment for one’s own account.76  If, however, an
SPV is buying many different obligations (including loans and loan
participations) over a period of time, an issue arises as to whether the
SPV would be viewed as engaged in some part of financing business;
such a finding would remove the SPV from the protection of the in-
vestment safe harbor.  To minimize this risk, certain guidelines should
be observed, including, for example, restricting the SPV to buying
loans in the secondary market rather than originating loans; not per-
mitting the SPV to buy revolving facilities, which raise an issue of
origination; not permitting negotiation of specific terms of loans;
and/or prohibiting an SPV from receiving amounts denominated as
fees that could be construed as having been received in return for per-
formance of services.
If the SPV is a foreign corporation with U.S. shareholders, ac-
count must also be taken of certain so-called “anti-avoidance” provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code.  These include the Subpart F
rules on “controlled foreign corporations” (CFCs), i.e. foreign corpo-
rations controlled by U.S. shareholders, and the “foreign personal
holding company” and “passive foreign investment company” (PFIC)
rules.
Under the Subpart F rules,77 certain earnings (including passive
interest and dividend income) of U.S.-controlled foreign corporations
may be treated as taxable to the U.S. shareholders even if not actually
distributed.  In addition, deemed dividends can result if a CFC’s as-
sets serve, either directly or indirectly, to secure a U.S. shareholder’s
debt; or if the debt is purchased or guaranteed by the CFC; or if two-
thirds or more of the CFC’s stock is used to secure the debt.78  Thus,
for example, if an SPV is a CFC and it buys receivables from a related
U.S. originator in a tax loan transaction, Subpart F issues could arise.
76. 26 U.S.C. § 864(b)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1999).  Under prior law, this safe harbor
treatment was available only if the “principal office” of the corporation were not in the United
States.  In determining the existence of a U.S. principal office, a corporation’s U.S. and non-U.S.
activities would be compared and if all or a substantial portion of certain enumerated functions
(the so-called “ten commandments”) were performed offshore, the safe harbor applied.  Effec-
tive with respect to tax years beginning after December 31, 1997, the non-U.S. principal office
requirement no longer applies.  See 26 U.S.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
77. 26 U.S.C. §§ 951–64 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
78. See 26 U.S.C. § 956(d) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(c) (1964).
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Under the foreign personal holding company rules, passive in-
come of a closely-held SPV can be imputed to U.S. shareholders.
This arises, however, only if the SPV is controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by five or fewer U.S. individuals.79
Under the PFIC rules, any U.S. shareholder of an SPV that is a
PFIC (i.e., that has primarily passive income), whether or not the U.S.
shareholders are in control, may be liable for an interest charge on
dividend distributions from the SPV, unless an election is made either
to recognize as dividends the SPV earnings on a current basis or, in
the case of regularly traded PFIC stock, to take into account each
year, under a mark-to-market regime, the built-in gain or loss attrib-
utable to the difference between the stock’s current value and the
shareholder’s adjusted tax basis therein.80
3. “Earnings Stripping.”  Under the so-called “earnings strip-
ping” rules of Section 163(j) of the Internal Revenue Code, a U.S.
corporate borrower may be limited in the extent to which it can claim
deductions on a current basis for interest expense.  Interest expense
subject to potential limitation under these provisions includes that on
debt owed to related persons (including, in particular, related non-
U.S. entities exempt from withholding tax under an applicable tax
treaty) that are wholly or partially exempt from U.S. federal income
tax81 or on debt guaranteed (whether via a formal guarantee or “com-
fort letter” or other arrangement) by such a person.82  The earnings
stripping provisions apply if the corporation has a debt-to-equity ratio
79. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 551–58 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
80. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1291–98 (1994 & Supp. 1999).  Under the mark-to-market election, a
PFIC shareholder’s adjusted basis in the PFIC stock will be increased by any amount previously
included in income as a result of the election and decreased by any amounts allowed as a deduc-
tion thereby.  26 U.S.C. § 1296(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
81. Interest that is subject to a reduced treaty rate of U.S. withholding tax is treated in part
as not subject to U.S. tax in proportion to the applicable treaty’s reduction of the U.S. statutory
withholding tax rate.  26 U.S.C. § 163(j)(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1999).  For example, assuming the
current U.S. statutory withholding tax rate of thirty percent, if the applicable treaty rate is fif-
teen percent, one-half of the interest paid or accrued to a resident of the treaty country will be
considered as not subject to U.S. federal income tax.
82. The provisions with respect to guaranteed debt do not apply (i) to the extent provided
in regulations, if the guarantor would have been subject to tax, on a net income basis, had inter-
est been paid to it, or (ii) if the borrowing taxpayer owns at least eighty percent of the guaran-
tor.  A loan guaranteed by a foreign affiliate subject to a full U.S. withholding tax (as opposed
to a net income tax) seemingly could, however, be subject to the earnings stripping rules.
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in excess of 1.5 to 1 and if its interest expense in a given taxable year
exceeds a prescribed threshold.83
At least under current law, the earnings stripping rules should
apply in cross-border securitization transactions only to the extent
that the transaction involves a tax loan, as opposed to a sale, of re-
ceivables.  This is because in a tax sale there is no interest expense.
Although there then may be a loss on the sale of receivables, there is
to date no provision treating such loss as interest expense for pur-
poses of the earnings stripping provisions.  This could change, how-
ever, if a loss on a sale of receivables were to be created, for purposes
of the earnings stripping rules, as the equivalent of interest.  Proposed
regulations have, to date, reserved on this issue.84
If a transaction involves a tax loan, the earnings stripping rules
could apply if, for example, the loan is guaranteed by a foreign parent
of the originator/borrower.  Only guarantees of underlying credit risk
with respect to transferred receivables, however, as opposed to guar-
antees of performance or warranties as to the nature and quality of
receivables, should trigger application of the earnings stripping rules
in such cases.85
4. Other Cross-Border Tax Issues.  Other tax issues that may
arise in cross-border securitizations include generation of currency
gains or losses under I.R.C. Section 988, to the extent, for example,
that a U.S. party to the transaction is entitled to receive (or required
to pay) currency other than U.S. dollars; potential withholding tax on
swap payments;86 and potential transfer price adjustments under
83. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(j)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1999).  Specifically, current interest deductions
will be denied if the corporation’s net interest expense in a given year exceeds fifty percent of its
annual adjusted taxable income, which is its taxable income computed with certain adjustments,
including ignoring net interest expense, any net operating loss deduction, or any depreciation,
amortization or depletion deduction.  Disallowed interest expense may be carried forward and
deducted in the taxable year in which the corporation has net interest expense in an amount less
than fifty percent of its adjusted taxable income.
84. See Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.163(j)–2(e)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 27907 (1991).  Cf. Temp.
Reg. § 1.861-9T(b)(3) (1988) (losses on sale of certain receivables treated as equivalent to inter-
est expense for purposes of source of income rules).  The latter provision discouraged use of
securitizations to maximize use by multi-national corporations of foreign tax credits by maxi-
mizing foreign source income.
85. The legislative history to Section 163(j) indicates that a guarantee for this purpose in-
cludes “any arrangement under which a person directly or indirectly assures, on a conditional or
unconditional basis, the payment of another’s obligation” under any indebtedness.  See H.R.
Rep. No. 103-111, at 686 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 917.
86. For U.S. purposes, although Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7 (1991) provides that swap payments
to foreign counterparties do not generally constitute U.S. source income (and thus are not sub-
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I.R.C. Section 482, where sales or other transfers take place between
affiliated parties in different jurisdictions.  Transfer pricing issues
could arise, for example, if there are multiple SPVs in different juris-
dictions or if receivables being sold arise from sales between U.S. and
non-U.S. affiliates.
Additionally, swaps and hedges may be subject to taxation.87  For
example, gain or loss may have to be recognized based on fluctuations
in the relative value of U.S. dollars and the currency of the assets.
There also may be tax issues where transfers are among related enti-
ties, such as multiple SPVs in different jurisdictions.
III.  EPILOGUE
My goal has been to provide an introduction to international se-
curitization.  Securitization has an increasingly international focus be-
cause, among other reasons, companies that wish to raise capital mar-
ket funding may not be located in countries with established capital
markets.  They therefore must structure deals that cross their national
borders.
Cross-border securitization, however, can be daunting to the
uninitiated, involving multiple legal systems with strange terms and
sometimes even stranger rules.  I have argued that it is unnecessary
for a securitization lawyer who does not regularly practice in foreign
jurisdictions to keep up with changes in foreign legal systems.  All
that is needed is a grasp of certain fundamental legal principles in or-
der to ask the right questions of local counsel and understand the re-
ject to U.S. withholding tax), non-periodic payments made to U.S. counterparties pursuant to a
swap agreement may give rise to U.S. source interest income.  Under Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(g)(4)
(1994), a “significant” non-periodic payment is treated as a loan to the U.S. counterparty and
the time value component associated with such loan must be recognized as U.S. source interest
for all purposes of the Code.  Although “significant” for these purposes is not defined, an exam-
ple in the regulations provides that a non-periodic payment is significant if it exceeds forty  per-
cent of the present value of the fixed payments under the swap agreement.  See Treas. Reg. §
1.446-3(g)(6) Example 3 (1993).  Thus, if a swap agreement provides for a significant non-
periodic payment and the foreign counterparty cannot claim the benefits of the portfolio inter-
est exemption or an applicable income tax treaty, the U.S. source interest income arising from
the significant non-periodic payment will be subject to U.S. withholding tax at a rate of thirty
percent.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-4(a)(3) (1997) (a withholding agent that pays amounts attrib-
utable to a notional principal contract described in Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(a) or § 1.988-2(e) shall
have no obligation to withhold on amounts paid under the terms thereof, (but not including any
amount treated as interest under Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(g) (1993)) regardless of whether a with-
holding certificate is provided, but income will generally be treated as effectively connected with
the conduct of a U.S. trade or business unless agent can rely on a withholding certificate to the
contrary).
87. Cf. supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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sponse and its implications.  This article has attempted to set forth
those principles.
In the future, this communication may become even easier.  As
this symposium demonstrates, the laws and rules governing interna-
tional securitization are being increasingly harmonized.  For example,
Spiros Bazinas’s article,88 as well as this one, analyzes the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law’s Convention on As-
signment of Receivables in International Trade, designed to harmo-
nize critical aspects of the laws applicable to cross-border
securitization.  Peter Jeffrey’s article discusses international harmoni-
zation of accounting standards.89  And Professor Frankel generally
examines the international unification of securitization law.90  With
time and luck, one day we may well be able to converse about inter-
national securitization through a true “universal language.”
88. Bazinas, supra note 16.
89. Jeffrey, supra note 28.
90. Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 475 (2002).
